On February 6, 2026, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost filed a landmark antitrust action against nine major multistate cannabis operators (MSOs), accusing them of forming a “cartel” to fix prices, coordinate shelf space, and crush local competition. The named defendants—including Green Thumb Industries, Curaleaf, and Trulieve—have largely remained silent, with most declining to comment on pending litigation.
Perhaps they should have seen this coming.
The only reason MedMen isn’t named as the tenth defendant is because they didn’t survive long enough. They collapsed in 2024 while pursuing the same national consolidation strategy that Yost alleges became anti-competitive coordination among the survivors.
Thanks to Adam Bierman, the ousted founder of MedMen, we have the documentation.
As a strategic consultant who advises on cannabis market structure—including testimony before Virginia’s Joint Committee on Retail Cannabis in October 2025—I’ve spent years analyzing how MSOs operate. I warned Virginia lawmakers that limited-license models create exactly the consolidation risks Ohio is now prosecuting. Bierman’s memoir confirms those warnings were justified.
In his book Weed Empire, published in 2025, Bierman attempted to write a redemption story. Instead, he inadvertently documented the strategy. He details the specific meetings, the specific executives, and the specific “oligopoly” mindset that the Ohio Attorney General is now alleging violates antitrust law.
The “99 Percent” Meeting
Ohio’s lawsuit alleges that MSOs coordinated to control the market. Bierman documents they did exactly that.
In a chapter that reads like evidence, Bierman describes a meeting with Ben Kovler (CEO of Green Thumb Industries), Boris Jordan (Chairman of Curaleaf), and Jason Vedadi (Founder of Harvest Health, later acquired by Trulieve)—three of the companies now named as defendants in Ohio’s case.
Bierman quotes the group’s ambition plainly: “Guys, we’re covering 99 percent of this country with our footprints.”
This wasn’t a gathering of competitors looking to out-innovate each other. It was a coordination of expansion strategies. These are the very same companies now accused of entering “reciprocal purchasing agreements” to lock Ohio’s independent growers out of dispensaries.
Ohio’s complaint alleges that in late 2022, during a period of “increased supply and declining prices,” senior MSO executives coordinated purchasing agreements to preserve market control. Bierman’s memoir documents that these same executives had already established the relationships and strategic alignment to do exactly that.
They didn’t want a market. They wanted controlled territory.
The complaint goes further, alleging the defendants also implemented “discriminatory supply arrangements and promotional terms”—the downstream mechanism through which coordinated purchasing translates into market exclusion. Bierman’s own description of MedMen’s expansion philosophy illuminates how this works in practice: “It’s growth at all costs. The zoning restrictions around cannabis retail are such that the first to plant their flag around the country in the most strategic locations will have a moat around their businesses for time immemorial.”
Secure the locations first, control distribution second, dictate terms to anyone seeking shelf access third. The “moat” Bierman described is the barrier Yost is now alleging was constructed through illegal coordination rather than legitimate competition.
“Merit-Based Oligopoly” as Market Design
Attorney General Yost accuses these companies of using their scale to eliminate competition. Bierman describes that elimination as the intended outcome of market design.
“The state… was poised to create another merit-based oligopoly,” Bierman writes about the Illinois market. “The commercial thrill of these programs lay in their exclusivity: the number of licenses was limited, making them immensely valuable.”
He explicitly describes their expansion strategy: “Blitz scaling.” The goal was never primarily to serve patients. Bierman describes these licenses as “golden tickets” — scarce by design, immensely valuable precisely because the regulatory framework limited who could hold them.
This confirms what independent operators have experienced firsthand: The “limited license” model becomes a mechanism for market concentration, favoring capital access over operational expertise, and creating conditions where early entrants can maintain dominance regardless of product quality or consumer preference.
The Operational Cost
The consequence isn’t just higher prices—it’s lower quality. When market access is restricted, the pressure to compete on excellence diminishes.
Bierman acknowledges this directly: “Our product did not need to be the best. It was about scale and repeatability.”
Because they controlled distribution channels (the exact “shelf-space allotment” scheme Yost is challenging), they didn’t have to compete on quality. They could prioritize “institutional weed” while independent craft growers struggled to access retail shelves.
Ohio’s complaint includes a revealing email from a Green Thumb Industries buyer explaining the consumer consequence: “In an effort to maintain our spend goal, we have accumulated a large amount of inventory that does not perform at the same rate as more popular brands…”. They were stocking competitors’ mediocre products to meet reciprocal quotas while blocking the brands consumers actually wanted.
A Necessary Distinction
Yost’s complaint employs language—”cartel,” “actively suppressing” competition—that echoes rhetoric historically deployed by prohibitionist organizations like Smart Approaches to Marijuana. The resemblance is superficial. SAM argues the cannabis industry itself is the problem. Yost is arguing that specific market structures enabled specific anticompetitive conduct by specific companies. The remedy he seeks isn’t recriminalization—it’s injunctive relief to restore competition within a legal market.
That distinction matters enormously for states still constructing their regulatory frameworks. The lesson from Ohio isn’t that cannabis legalization invites cartel behavior. The lesson is that limited-license architectures, combined with mandatory vertical integration, create the structural conditions where such behavior becomes economically rational. Open licensing, canopy limitations, and unbundled supply chains don’t eliminate corporate ambition—they channel it toward competing on product quality rather than coordinating to exclude competitors from shelf space.
Why This Lawsuit Changes Everything
Ohio isn’t just prosecuting alleged bad behavior—it’s potentially establishing precedent that could reshape how states design cannabis markets.
The complaint itself alleges that this conduct extends beyond Ohio’s borders—that these firms engaged in the same cartel behavior “in other states, not just Ohio”. That language is an open invitation to other Attorneys General. If Yost prevails, MSO investor presentations describing “oligopolies” could become evidence of anti-competitive intent in other jurisdictions. States designing adult-use frameworks can point to Ohio as proof that limited-license models create structural antitrust risks. Independent operators may find stronger legal grounds to challenge exclusionary practices wherever they encounter them.
The defendants have told their investors they target “markets that are monopolistic or oligopolistic in nature, where there is limited supply and thus limited competition” (Green Thumb Industries, 2018 Annual Report). Ohio is the first state to examine whether that strategy crosses the line from aggressive business tactics into antitrust violations.
The Warning for 2026
MedMen filed for bankruptcy with $411 million in liabilities because, eventually, market fundamentals catch up to market manipulation. Even dominant players can’t sustain operations built on artificial scarcity forever.
But while MedMen collapsed, the model persists. The companies Yost is challenging have built their businesses around limited-license markets—the same structures that create conditions where the alleged conduct becomes economically rational, if not legally permissible.
Ohio has now challenged that premise in court.
Attorney General Yost doesn’t need to speculate about intent. Bierman documented the meetings, the strategy, and the executives who coordinated national expansion plans. Pennsylvania and New Hampshire are debating their adult-use market frameworks right now. Virginia is finalizing its retail architecture for a November 2026 launch. Each can implement competitive safeguards—open licensing, canopy caps, unbundled vertical integration requirements—that prevent the conduct Ohio is prosecuting. Or they can replicate the “merit-based oligopoly” model and potentially face similar market failures.
The strategy is documented. The lawsuit is filed. The only variable left is whether policymakers are paying attention.
Featured image courtesy of Max Jackson
Max Jackson is the founder of Cannabis Wise Guys, a strategic consulting firm advising operators, investors, and state legislatures on cannabis market structure and operational feasibility. His analysis has been published in Marijuana Moment and Beard Bros, and he testified before Virginia’s Joint Committee on Retail Cannabis in October 2025. Max made sure to purchase a used copy of Weed Empire, so as not to support the author.
